Reining in the Tenth Amendment: Finding a
Principled Limit to the Non-Commandeering Doctrine
of United States v. Printz
INTRODUCTION

For much of the twentieth century, the Court and commentators pronounced the Tenth Amendment,' embodied in the concept
of federalism as a check on Congress's enumerated powers,2 a dead
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Specifically, the Tenth Amendment provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
2 &eYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). The Court defined federalism:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any
more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected
both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in
which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id.; see also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1001, 1015-22
(1995). For most of its history, the Court applied a "delegated power" model of
federalism. See id. at 1016. Under this model, the Court would review a law by making a direct inquiry into the scope of Congress's enumerated powers. See id. If the
congressional action was beyond the scope of the authority delegated, the Court
would hold that the power was properly reserved to the states. See id. This method
is most consistent with the express language of the Tenth Amendment. See U.S.
CON Sr. amend. X. The court adopted the "state enclave" model in NationalLeague
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See Caminker, supra, at 1016-17. Under this
model, certain areas such as education are considered traditional government functions and are beyond the scope of Congress's legislative authority. See id. at 1017.
The Court expressly overruled NationalLeague of Cities and its "state enclave" model
in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See id.
The Garcia Court held the traditional government function test unworkable and
explained that the Court should invoke the principles of federalism only where the
political process had failed. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546. The most recent incarnation of federalism, and the one upon which this Note focuses, is the "autonomy
model." See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L.
REV. 633, 641 (1993). The "autonomy model" asserts that the state and federal governments are each sovereign with respect to their discrete political communities.
See Caminker, supra, at 1019.
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letter.! Led by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, however, the Supreme
4
Court has breathed new life into the doctrine. More than a mere
tautology," the Tenth Amendment now imposes substantive limits on
the scope of Congress's enumerated powers,6 as well as the manner
in which Congress may validly exercise those powers.7 The Supreme
Court has expounded on the merits of our system of dual sovereignty
in great detail.8 Among the virtues theoretically secured by the diffusion of sovereign power are the accountability of state and federal officials to their respective electorates, 9 the reduced risk of tyranny,'0
SSee Powell, supra note 2, at 634 (arguing that there was no firm basis in the
Constitution for federalism and that the Court should refrain from interpreting
broad substantive content into the Tenth Amendment) (citing Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941)).
See for example FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi (ERC), 456
U.S. 742, 775-97 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 455-73 (1991), and New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 147-88 (1992), decisions authored by Justice O'Connor that track the doctrine's development. See also Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2368-84 (1997),
where justice Scalia expanded the anti-commandeering doctrine.
See New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57 (explaining that Congress's commerce power
is subject to affirmative limits imposed by the Tenth Amendment). But see Darly,
312 U.S. at 123-24 (asserting that the Tenth Amendment merely states a truism and
does not secure any substantive rights).
6 See United Statesv. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 566-68 (1995) (holding
that the
national government had failed to demonstrate a nexus between guns in school
zones and interstate commerce). The Court remarked that, because the federal
government's powers are limited and enumerated, there must be a judicially enforceable outer limit to the Interstate Commerce Clause. See id. at 566. Although
suggesting that some educational activity might affect commerce, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that those activities having no such effect must be left to the
states. See id. at 551, 566-67.
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384 (announcing that, although Congress has the
authority to require background checks before handgun sales, it may not order state
and local officials to implement the policy); New York, 505 U.S. at 149, 177 (arguing
that, although it would be within Congress's commerce authority to directly regulate low-level radioactive waste and preempt state regulation in the field, Congress
may not commandeer state legislatures to affect the same end); Gregory, 501 U.S. at
473 (holding that Congress could not properly direct the State of Missouri to
change the mandatory retirement age for its state judges). But see United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) (instructing that "Congress must possess
the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact
conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution.").
SSee Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377-78; New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69; Gregory, 501 U.S.
at 458. But cf Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. RLy. 903, 907 (1994) (arguing that federalism, as defined by the Court, does not serve any of the purposes that the Court proffers).
SSee New York, 505 U.S. at 169; see alsoSteven G. Calabresi, "A Gouernment of Limited and Enumerated Powers".• In Defense of Pnited States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REv.
752, 777-78 (1995) (arguing that local decision makers engage in a more informed
cost benefit analysis than their national counterparts); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Eco-

1998]

NON-COMMANDEERiNG DOCTRINE

1367

the diversification of policy choices," and the increased participation
of voters in the political process." Although the textual and historical bases for the Court's model of federalism have been questioned 3
the Court's recent jurisprudence has embraced the proposition that
the Tenth Amendment confers upon the states a measure qf inviolable autonomy. 4 The Court's most forceful articulation of this premise is through the non-commandeering doctrine, introduced in New
York v. United States' and extended last term in United States v. Printz.'6
nomics of Federalismand the ProperScope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DmIGo L.
Riv. 555, 563 (1994) (asserting that federalism promotes efficiency because decision makers in decentralized governments are held responsible for their choice of
social policy). But see Caminker, supra note 2, at 1064 (submitting that commandeering does not compromise accountability because local officials can counter any
effort to shift the blame for an unpopular federal program).
10 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378; New York, 505 U.S. at 181; Gregory, 501 U.S. at
458-59; see also Caminker, supra note 2, at 1075 (reminding that the Framers also
envisioned strong states providing a military check against a powerful central government, a check that is somewhat anachronistic today). See generally Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 150007 (1987) (explaining that federalism protects against tyranny through mobility of
citizens, self-interested government, and diffusion of power); Deborah J. Merritt,
The GuaranteeClause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 5-7 (1988) (explaining that state and local governments check federal power
through lobbying and litigation, regulating in areas ignored by Congress, and providing a base of political support).
1 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). Compare Merritt, supranote 10, at 10 (describing states as ideal laboratories for experiments) with
Caminker, supra note 2, at 1078-79 (asserting that congressional commandeering
does not threaten a state's ability to experiment more than instances of preemption). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does FederalismPromote Innovation?, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980) (proposing that federalism actually discourages state politicians from undertaking risky innovation).
Compare Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 78990 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting
that federalism allows citizens to participate in local government) and Deborah J.
Merritt, Federalism as Empowernent, 47 FLA. L. REv. 541, 548 (1995) (asserting that
the "lessons of self rule" are more easily learned at the state and local levels, where
government is more readily accessible) with Rubin & Feeley, supra note 8, at 916
(recognizing that many scholars work under the assumption that federalism promotes citizen participation in government, but suggesting that there is no empirical
or theoretical support for that proposition).
is See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957, 19902007 (1993) (demonstrating that the Framers' original understanding was that
Conress could commandeer state executives).
I See Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2376; New York, 505 U.S. at 177 (recognizing that the
Tenth Amendment reserves a core of sovereignty to the states).
1s 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
16 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
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The non-commandeering doctrine forbids Congress from commanding a state legislature to legislate in a particular manner,17 or from directing state and local officials to implement national policy. 8
This Note will explore the limits of the non-commandeering
doctrine. Specifically, the Note will seek to answer a question left
unresolved by Printz: whether Congress may command local officials
to undertake purely ministerial tasks. 9 The answer depends on
whether the intent of the Framers and the structure of the Constitution mandate the non-commandeering doctrine, 20 or whether normative considerations define the analysis.2
Part I explores the Court's revival of federalism jurisprudence in
National League of Cities v. Usey,2 until the Court's temporary abandonment of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress's enumerated powers in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority." This section concludes that the Court's return to federalism
faltered because the Court's test lacked a guiding principle and was
therefore irretrievably vague.24 Part II discusses the advent and development of the non-commandeering doctrine in the New York and
Printz cases." Part III challenges the reasoning behind the noncommandeering doctrine.6 Specifically, this section posits that, even
if the guiding principles behind the doctrine are sound, an absolute
prohibition on this manner of exercising the commerce power is
unwarranted given the deficiency in the textual and historical foun-

17

See New York, 505 U.S. at 188.

18 SeePintz, 117S. Ct. at 2384.

1See id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Court
.appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting
requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its
Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid").
20 See New York, 505 U.S. at 157 (reasoning that "[ojur
task would be the same
even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding and

applying the framework set forth in the Constitution.").
See Merritt, supra note 10, at 10 (arguing that identifiable values justify federalism jurisprudence).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also infra notes 31-99 and
accompanying text
(discussing revival of the Court's federalism jurisprudence).
14 See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court has held
that a law is impermissibly vague where persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
25 See infra notes 100-65 and accompanying
text.
See infra notes 166-90 and accompanying text.
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dations." Additionally, Part IV demonstrates that the doctrine is
overinclusive by applying it to the National Child Search Assistance
Act of 1990 (NCSAA), 2 which commands state and local officials to
forward to federal agencies on an expedited basis information about
missing children." Part V contends that even though NCSAA does
not raise any of the normative concerns acknowledged in both New
York and Printz, the Court would nevertheless hold the Act unconstitutional under the non-commandeering doctrine. Part V proposes
that if the Court must define the line between national and state
power it should do so by explicitly protecting the principles of federalism." The Court should abandon the non-commandeering doctrine in favor of a balancing test that weighs the benefits of a national program against its burden on state sovereignty.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERALISM

For the forty years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities,"' the Court relied on the political system to
draw the proper line between federal and state power.32 Before National League of Cities, the Court agreed with commentators that
states' interests were adequately represented in the House of Representatives and that such representation precluded any overreaching
by Congress into the province of the states.s" The point seemed well
settled and accepted until the Supreme Court heard arguments in
NationalLeague of Cities in 19760
See infranotes 183-90 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5779-5780 (West 1995).
9 See infranotes 191-Error! Bookmark not defined,
and accompanying text.
so See infranotes 227-85 and accompanying text.
31 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
32 SwJEssE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL.
POLrCA.L PRocESS: A
FuNanoNAL. RCONSMERATMON OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 176 (1980).
s3 See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. RzV. 543, 558
(1954); see also CHOPERt, supra note 32, at 175-77. Professor Choper's "Federalism
Proposal" asserted that
[t)he federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-i-vis the
states; rather, the constitutional issue of whether federal action is beyond the authority of the central government and thus violated
"states' rights" should be treated as nonjusticiable, final resolution being relegated to the political branches ....
Id. at 175. The very structure of the national political system ensures that states' interests are adequately protected; moreover, history shows that states' rights have not
been trammeled. See id. at 176.
34 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47
FiA. L. Rzv. 499, 505-06
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NationalLeague of Cities addressed a 1974 amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)." In its original form, FLSA re-

quired any employer involved in interstate commerce to comply both
with federal minimum hourly wage and federal overtime pay requirements. FLSA specifically exempted state employers." In 1974,
Congress amended FLSA to bring state employers under its auspices."e Consequently, state and local authorities challenged the
amendment on various grounds, including the Tenth Amendment.39
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found Congress's
1974 Act constitutionally deficient. 40 While acknowledging that the
Tenth Amendment traditionally had not been interpreted as a substantive limit on the commerce power,4 ' the Court determined that
the Tenth Amendment did have a substantive component.4 Even
where Congress has plenary authority to legislate,sJustice Rehnquist
explained, the Tenth Amendment might provide a bar to Congress

(1995). Although the Supreme Court had invalidated laws on federalism grounds
between the late 1800s and 1937, after NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937), United States v. Darby,312 U.S. 100 (1941), and W'ckard v. Ftburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942), the Court abandoned federalism as a substantive limit on the power of
Congress. See Chemerinsky, supra, at 505-06; see also LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AmERICAN
CONsrrLroNAL LAw 378 (2d ed. 1988). Between 1937 and 1976, "the conventional
wisdom was that federalism in general-and the rights of states in particular-provided no judicially-enforceable limits on congressional power." Id.
See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836. National League of Cities noted
that this amendment broadened the definition of employer to include public agencies. See id.
3 See id. at 835-36.
37 See id. at 836. In its original form, the
statute provided:
"Employer" includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include
the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State.
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
8 SeNationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at836.
39 See id. at 836-37.
4
See id. at 834, 852.
4 See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have the power
to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes").
See NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842. Justice Rehnquist proclaimed:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism,'
stating merely that 'all is retained which has not been surrendered,'... it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly
declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function in a federal system.
Id. at 842-43 (citations omitted).
4S See id. at 842.
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exercising its power against the "States as States."" The Court recognized an area of inviolable state sovereignty that Congress could not
disturb."5 The Court held that the Tenth Amendment protected
states when Congress tried to regulate in an area of traditional government function.4' Structuring wages for state employees, the
Court reasoned, was so integral to a state's proper operation that it
lay beyond Congress's power to regulate.4' After National League of
Cities, the challenge was for the judiciary to determine whether a
given government function was in fact traditional."
Five years later, the Court revisited the traditional government
function test in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n."
In 1976, Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),'O establishing a national program to protect
against the effects of surface mining. 5 During the initial phase of
the program, the federal government would regulate surface miners
directly." In the permanent phase of SMCRA, either the state or the
" See id. at 854 (noting that "the States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce*).
45 See id. at
845.
0 See id. at 852. The Court held "that insofar as the challenged amendments

operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional government functions, they are not within the authority granted
Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 8." Id. The Court refrained from providing an exhaustive list of traditional government functions. See id. at 851 n.16. Justice Rehnquist
enumerated 'fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks
and recreation" as examples of services traditionally provided by a state to its citizens. Id. at 851.
47

See id. at 845.

0 See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(demonstrating that even the majority could not make a principled distinction
among schools, hospitals, fire and police departments, and railroads as to whether
they constituted traditional functions); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (noting that after NationalILeague of Cities the judiciary had struggled to identify traditional government functions to determine if a
state was immune from Congress's commerce clause authority).
49 See 452 U.S. 264, 286 (1981).
50 80 U.S.C. § 1201
(1976).
5,See Hode4 452 U.S. at 269. SMCRA had set forth several performance standards:
(a) restoration of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its approximate original contour; (c) segregation and
preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles used as dams
and embankments; (f)
revegetation of mined areas; and (g) spoil disposal.
Id. (citing 80 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (1976)).
W2See id.SMCRA directed the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate the Act's
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federal government would regulate surface miners consistent with
federal guidelines.
Testing SMCRA against the framework from National League of
Cities, the Court determined that the Tenth Amendment challenge
could not prevail.'" SMCRA did not implicate the traditional government function test because it regulated individuals and not
states." Instead, the Court asserted, SMCRA conformed to the doctrine of cooperative federalism,"8 because the states had the option of
either regulating consistently with federal guidelines or being preempted."' After Hodd4 the traditional government function test remained intact and the doctrine of cooperative federalism was formally acknowledged and condoned by the Court." Therefore, while
the judiciary still had to distinguish between laws affecting traditional and nontraditional government functions, Congress could encourage compliance with a regulatory scheme by threatening to preempt the field.-"
The next year, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)58 in Federal
environmental performance standards and to enforce them during the interim
phase. See id. During the interim phase, SMCRA held the Secretary responsible for
instituting an inspection program to ensure compliance with the standards. See id.
at 270.
3 See id. Only those states that submitted a plan demonstrating the state's ability to ensure continued compliance with federal regulations would be approved to
take over during the permanent phase. See id. at 271. SMCRA required the Secretary to continue administering the program within any state that had not submitted
an ajproved plan. See id. at 272.
See id. at 290-91. The Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association
had asserted that SMCRA interfered with the ability of the state to regulate land
use--a traditional government function. See id. at 289.
See id.at 288.
66 See id. at 289.
Cooperative federalism recognizes that "where Congress has
the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, ... [it may]
offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation." New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (citations omitted).
61 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289. The Court explained that under SMCRA states
could administer the program consistent with government guidelines, or alternativel, the federal government would implement the Act. See id. at 288-89.
See id. at 287-88. The Court reformulated the National League of Cities framework into a three-part test. See id. Under the test, a statute enacted pursuant to the
commerce power would be invalid if it (1) regulated the states as states; (2) addressed matters that were indisputable "'attribute[s] of state sovereignty"; or (3)
impaired the ability of the state "'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional government functions.'" Id. (citations omitted).
See id.at 290-91.

16 U.S.C. §§ 2603, 2611 (1976).
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Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi (EERC). 6' PURPA encouraged conservation of energy and efficiency in utilities resources, as
well as stabilization of consumer energy prices."' PURPA directed
state utility commissions, along with nonregulated utilities, to consider specific rate schedules and regulatory practices." Although
PURPA did not require state or nonregulated utilities to adopt the
proposed rate schedule, they were required to report to the Secretary
of Energy annually for ten years regarding their consideration of the
proposal."
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, sustained
PURPA against a Tenth Amendment challenge." Justice Blackmun
began the Court's Tenth Amendment analysis by distinguishing
PURPA from FLSA, the legislation at issue in National League of Cities." Whereas National League of Cities examined the Tenth Amendment as the basis for state immunity from generally applicable laws, 67
FERC considered the novel question of whether the federal government could use the regulatory mechanism of the state to implement
federal policy." The majority concluded that the Tenth Amendment
presented no bar, because the challenged provisions merely conditioned state involvement in an otherwise preemptive area on consid61 Se456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982).
2 See id. at 746. President Carter signed into law a package
of legislation, of

which PURPA was a part, to remedy the nation's energy crisis. See id. at 745. The
Court noted the Senate's findings that
the generation of electricity consumed more than 25% of all energy
resources used in the United States. Approximately one-third of the
electricity in this country was generated through use of oil and natural
gas, and electricity generation was one of the fastest growing segments
of the Nation's economy. In part because of their reliance on oil and
gas, electricity utilities were plagued with increasing costs and decreasing efficiency in the use of their generating capacities; each of these
factors had an adverse effect on rates to consumers and on the economy as a whole. Congress accordingly determined that conservation
by electricity utilities of oil and natural gas was essential to the success
of any effort to lessen the country's dependence on foreign oil, to
avoid a repetition of the shortage of natural gas that had been experienced in 1977, and to control consumer costs.
Id. at 745-46 (citations omitted).
6
See id. at 746-47. Specifically, PURPA commanded both state regulatory
authorities and nonregulated utilities to consider adopting certain rate structures.
See id.
SSee id. at 7 49.
See id. at 745, 769-70.
Se id. at 758-59.
67 SeeNational League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
845 (1976).
a See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759
(1982).
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eration of the federal proposals. 9 The states could always stop regulating utilities; 0 thus, the Court opined that PURPA did not impair
the states' ability to function in the federal system. 7'
Justice O'Connor, however, vehemently disagreed with Justice
Blackmun's Tenth Amendment analysis. 2 In partial dissent, the Justice laid the foundation for the federalism doctrine of the New York
and Printz decisions.! PURPA, Justice O'Connor argued, would conscript state and local utility commissions into the "national bureaucratic army."74 Although PURPA did not mandate adoption of the
proposed regulations, the Justice maintained that the Tenth
Amendment inquiry should not end there."

Therefore, Justice O'Connor applied the traditional govern-

ment function test 8 and emphasized three points." First, the Justice
opined that PURPA set the agenda for local regulatory commissions,
forcing them to consider the federal pricing scheme. 7'8 Justice
O'Connor argued that this clearly regulated the states as states.9
Second, the justice explained that PURPA violated the second prong
of the traditional government function test, because it addressed
matters that are indisputably "'attributes of state sovereignty.' 8' 2
Third, the Justice noted that PURPA violated the final prong of the
test, because forcing state and local commissions to consider federal
proposals would impair their ability to perform traditional functions. '
Having demonstrated why PURPA should fail the traditional
government function test, Justice O'Connor articulated the principles that the test sought to protect." First, the Justice stressed that as
they comply with federally mandated tasks, local officials have less

See id. at 769-70.

70 See id. at
71 See id. at
7
See id. at
is See id. at
74

766.

765-66.
775 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
786-91 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in

part).
" See id. at 777 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
76 See id. at 778 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
7 See id. at 778-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
78 See id. at 779 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
79

Seid.

so IERC, 456 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (citations omitted).
See id. at 781 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
See id. at 787-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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time to spend on matters to which they were elected to attend."
Second, the FERC Court pointed out that, because the lines of political accountability are blurred when Congress compels local action,
state and local officials might be unfairly blamed by their electorates
for the adverse effects of a federal policy." Third, the Court reasoned that, because federalism encourages states to experiment with
new social, political, and economic ideas, mandating a federal policy
would stifle innovation." Fourth, Justice O'Connor noted that, because citizens have more direct access to the political process at the
local level, federalism allows citizens to participate more actively in
government." Fifth, the Justice emphasized that, because sovereign
states protect the interests of their citizens from overreaching by the
national government, federalism exists as a check against tyranny.e
Justice O'Connor charged the majority with endangering these values of federalism by ignoring the concerns set forth in National
League of Cities."
While sustaining the traditional government function test and
reaffirming the doctrine of cooperative federalism," FERC exemplified the problems inherent in applying that test consistently." Consequently, whether Congress had legislated in an area of integral

84

See id. at 787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Seeid.

a See id. at 782-88 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
See 1'ERC, 456 U.S. at 789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
rtSee id. at 790 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
See id. at 775 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the Hodel case analysis).
See IERC, 456 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). Justice O'Connor maintained that PURPA commanded the states to act and
therefore impermissibly regulated the "States as States." See id. The Justice opined
that
[w]hile the statute's ultimate aim may be the regulation of private utility companies, PURPA addresses its commands solely to the States. Instead of requesting private utility companies to adopt lifeline rates,
declining block rates, or other PURPA standards, Congress directed
state agencies to appraise the appropriateness of those standards. It is
difficult to argue that a statute structuring the regulatory agenda of a
state agency is not a regulation of the "State."
Id. (emphasis added); cf.NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 161 (1992)
(citing IERC for the proposition that the Court "'never has sanctioned explicitly a
federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations'")
(citation omitted). Most significant for this Note is the apparent difficulty the
Court may have in determining when a state has in fact been commanded.
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state function was open to broad interpretation-apparently too
open for the test to remain viable."
In Garcia, the Court overruled National League of Cities and its
traditional government function test." Garcia considered the same
minimum wage provisions at issue in National League of Cities.9' Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun opined that the traditional
government function test was unworkable because there was no
principled way to distinguish between a traditional and a nontraditional government function." As Garcia demonstrated, the traditional government function test failed, in large part, because it did
not express any guiding principle. 5 As a result, lower courts were
unable to apply it consistently."
In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should not
abandon its efforts to protect the essential elements of state sovereignty.9 TheJustice maintained that, rather than leave the matter to
Congress's "underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint," the Court
should weigh state autonomy as a factor when reviewing a law
whereby Congress seeks to regulate the "States as States."" Justice
91 See infranote 96 and accompanying text.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985). The
Court held that
the principle and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the
States will not be promulgated.
Id. at 556.
9s See id. at 530. The trial court ruled that the municipality's ownership and operation of its mass-transit system constituted a traditional government function. See
id. Therefore, the municipality was exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) wage requirements under the NationalLeague of Cities test. See id.
9
See id. at 531.
95 See generally TRIBE, supra note 34, at 395 (stating that the decisions after National League of Cities demonstrated that the Court "could neither justify [the traditional function test] by reference to the Constitution nor elaborate it by reference
to any workable principles of federalism").
See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538 (enumerating lower court opinions, which have
made contradictory conclusions as to whether particular government functions were
traditional).
See id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice O'Connor urged that
[t]he problems of federalism in an integrated national economy are
capable of more responsible resolution than holding that the States as
States retain no status apart from that which Congress chooses to let
them retain. The proper resolution, I suggest, lies in weighing state
autonomy as a factor in the balance when interpreting the means by
which Congress can exercise its authority on the States as States.
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O'Connor, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, predicted a judicial return to a substantive interpretation of the Tenth Amendment if Congress continually reached into the states' domain."
II. THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE
Consistent with the predictions of Justices O'Connor and
Rehnquist, the Court returned to federalism jurisprudence through
the non-commandeering doctrine in New York v. United States and
Printz v. United States.'"° Perhaps cognizant of the demise of the traditional government function test, the Court dispensed with a balancing test and promulgated an absolute bar against congressional

commands to states.' 0'
In the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985 (LLRWAA),'02 the New York Court explained that Congress addressed the danger that many states no longer had a viable outlet for
low-level radioactive waste produced within their borders.9' In 1985,
the Court pointed out, only three states had disposal sites for lowlevel radioactive waste-all other states relied on those three states
for disposal of their waste."' 4 LLRWAA, the Justice noted, sought to
end this reliance by setting out a seven-year timetable, at the end of
which each state would have a regional outlet for its low-level radioactive waste. of
"0 incentives
The Courtand
acknowledged
that Congress
enacted a
combination
penalties to advance
its purposes.'
Id. Id
See id. at 580, 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that "I would not shirk
the duty acknowledged by NationalLeague of Cities and its progeny, and I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional
responsibility."); id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (pronouncing that concern
for state sovereignty would someday garner the support of a majority on the Court).
o See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (explaining
that
"[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."); Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997)
(noting that '[wie held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact
or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly.").
SSee New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
102 42 U.S.C. § 2021
(1982).
10s See New York, 505 U.S. at 151. In 1980, Congress authorized states to join regional compacts for disposal of their low-level radioactive waste. See id. Beginning
in 1986, this Act would have given certain disposal facilities the right to exclude
waste not produced by its members. See id. Because 31 states would have been left
without an approved waste disposal cite under the original act, Congress passed the
amendment at issue in New York See id.
104 See id. (pointing out that in 1985 only South Carolina, Washington,
and Nevada had approved disposal facilities).
105 See id. at 151-52. Congress based the 1985 amendment on a plan proposed by

1378

SETON HALL LA WREVEW

[Vol. 28:1365

First, the Justice stressed that a monetary incentive taxed the
waste produced by a state and reimbursed those states who met certain goals.'0 Second, the Court noted that Congress authorized sited
states'0 to increase surcharges against, and ultimately deny access to,
states that failed to meet their deadlines.'0 Lastly, the New York
Court explained that the take-tide provision required a state to take
tide to any waste produced in-state if no other provisions had been
made by the state for the waste's disposal."' The state, explained the
Court, would be held liable for any damages caused by the state's
failure to take possession of the waste."'
The Court upheld the first two provisions as proper exercises of
the spending and commerce powers. 1 The Court held that the taketidtle provision, however, amounted to an unconstitutional command
to state legislatures either to accept ownership of the waste or to
regulate pursuant to Congress's instructions."3 This "take-tide"
mandate provided Justice O'Connor with the opportunity to promulgate the non-commandeering doctrine."' The Court ruled that
even though Congress may regulate commerce directly it may not
dictate how the states regulate commerce."
the National Governors' Association. See id. at 151. Under the plan, sited states
(those states that will be accepting waste) agreed to receive waste from unsited states
for an additional seven years, provided the unsited states ended their reliance by
1992. See id.
106 See id. at 152-54.
10 See id. at 152-53. Under LLRWAA, sited states collected a surcharge for their
services and deposited one-quarter of those surcharges in a fund managed by the
Secretary of Energy. See id. at 152. The Secretary paid monetary incentives to those
states that had met their deadlines. See id.
'" See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining the meaning of sited
versus unsited states).
109 See New York, 505 U.S. at 153.
110 See id. at 153-54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2)
(C) (1982)).
SSee id.
See id. at 17-74. The Court held that the second incentive, which authorized
sited states to eventually deny access to unsited states, comported with the doctrine
of cooperative federalism-offering states a choice between regulating consistent
with the federal regulation or being preempted. See id.
11 See id. at
176.
"4 See id. at 177-78.
SSee New York, 505 U.S. at 177-78. The Court exhorted that
whether or not a particularly strong federal interest enables Congress
to bring state governments within the orbit of generally applicable federal regulation, no Member of the Court has ever suggested that such
a federal interest would enable Congress to command a state government to enact state regulation. No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the
authority to require the States to regulate. The Constitution instead
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Justice O'Connor predicated this rule on two lines of reasoning.' First, the Justice examined prior case law and the Framers' intent."7 Second, the Court expounded the normative rationales prohibiting Congress from exercising its commerce power in this
manner.
Based on the Court's precedent, Justice O'Connor announced
that Congress could not commandeer a state's legislature by compelling it to implement a federal regulatory program." ' Citing Hodet"
and IERC,"' the Court suggested that the laws in these cases were
upheld because neither statute at issue commandeered state legislatures.'2 2 Next, the Court suggested that the Hodel and FERC holdings
were not innovations because they were consistent with the Framers'
intent in drafting the Tenth Amendment." The Court quoted several cases, dating as far back as 1868,124 noting that the United States
relies on the preservation of strong constituent states for its well being.
After discussing prior case law, the Court addressed the Framers' intent, asserting that Congress's ability to use states as its agents
had been a matter of heated debate among the Framers.'" Justice
O'Connor quoted Alexander Hamilton, who observed in Federalist
gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to preempt contrary state regulation. Where a federal interest is sufficiently
strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not
conscript state governments as its agents.
Id. at 178 (emphasis in original).
16 See id., 505 U.S. at 155-69.
1
See id. at 155-59.
"ie

See id.at 159-69.

See id. at 161.
no See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding
of Hode).
1
See supra notes 60-91 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding
119

of FERC).

In SeeNew York, 505 U.S. at 161.
2
See id.at 162. But see supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing Justice

O'Connor's partial dissent in PERC that asserted that PURPA compelled the states
to act).

See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868).

1

See New York, 505 U.S. at 162-63. As the Court stated in Lane County
Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution.

The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power,
directly upon the citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which

acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States.
Id. at 162 (quoting Lane County, 74 U.S. at 76).
In See id. at 163.
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No. 15 that the great shortcoming of the Articles of Confederation
was that it only authorized the Constitutional Congress to legislate
against states in their corporate capacities, rather than against the
individuals that comprised the states.'27 The Justice noted that Hamilton concluded that the new government must operate directly
against individuals.'"
Next, the Court examined the Constitutional Convention of
1787 and its consideration of the Virginia and New Jersey Plans."
The New York Court pointed out that, whereas the New Jersey Plan
would have required Congress to obtain state approval before legislating, the Virginia Plan would permit national legislation directly
over individuals.'"0 Legislating directly against the states had proved
ineffectual under the Articles of Confederation; the Justice noted
that the Convention therefore adopted the Virginia Plan."" The
Court ended its analysis of the Framers' intent by quoting several
delegates to the convention who reiterated that laws, to be effective,
must be enforced against individuals rather than against states 3
Justice O'Connor concluded that, because the Framers had abandoned legislating against the states as an effective means of governance, they had foreclosed Congress from considering that option."
Having determined that prior case law and the Framers' intent
both supported a non-commandeering rule, the Justice addressed
the normative arguments in favor of such a rule.'-" Concerns over
tyranny and accountability animated Justice O'Connor's analysis.'"
First, the Justice contended that, if the federal government could
command the states to legislate in a certain fashion, it would raise
the same concerns about tyranny that led the Framers to adopt the
Virginia Plan."
More importantly, the Justice stressed, LLRWAA
greatly endangered accountability. "
After New York, the Court
12

See id. (citing THE FEDERALIsr No. 15, at 108 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton

Rossiter ed., 1961)).
a Seeid.
See id. at 164.
IS0 See id.
1 See New York, 505 U.S. at 165.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 166.
1'4 See id. at 164-69.
1"5 Sm id.
"'

13

See id. at 164.

17 See New York, 505 U.S. at 169. Justice O'Connor distinguished between the
effects of traditional preemption and commandeering. See id. at 168. The Justice
argued that when a state law is preempted local officials are free to pursue their
electorate's other priorities. See id. When Congress mandates legislation, however,
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barred Congress from infringing upon a state's sovereignty by mandating specific state legislation.'"
Five years later in Printz v. United States, the Court again endeavored to define the proper scope of Congress's authority in our system of dual sovereignty.'39 P intz signifies that Congress may not
command state or local officials to implement federal policies,
thereby expanding the holding in New York'4 Although it first appears that Printz strikes a severe blow to federal power, on closer inspection the damage is not so grave for several reasons.14 First, Congress rarely commands state officials."4 Second, Congress can usually
accomplish the same ends by more traditional means."4 Nevertheless, Printz has serious ramifications because it may foil the efforts of
Congress to implement certain important policy objectives.'"
In Prinz the Court addressed the interim provisions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 (Brady Act),"which required local law enforcement officials to perform background checks on potential gun purchasers.'4 Congress exceeded
the Tenth Amendment limit on its commerce power, the Court declared, by commanding local officials to act." 7

The Brady Act ordered the Attorney General to implement by
1998 a uniform national background check system.'" In the interim,
the Brady Act required states' chief law enforcement officers
(CLEOs) to conduct background checks on prospective gun purlocal officials are unable to pursue other policy preferences. See id. The concern
over accountability is particularly strong where, as here, the decision is not made in
full view of the public and the local official may unfairly bear the burden of the local electorate's disapproval. See id. at 168-69.
"'8 See id. at
177.
1
See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (extending
the
Court's holding in New York); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67
(1995) (holding for the first time in 50 years that Congress had exceeded the scope
of its commerce power).
1'0 See Printz 117 S. CL
at 2384.
'
1
See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
1
See Pintz, 117 S. CL at 2375 (noting the absence of commandeering
statutes
in our nation's history until recent years).
SSee New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68 (recognizing
that Congress may encourage
states to execute or legislate either through conditional spending measures or by
threatening preemption).
1
See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the cost-benefit analysis
Congress employs when deciding whether to enact a new policy).
See PUB. L. No. 103-159, 107 STAT. 1536 (1993) (amending the
Gun Control
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922, 924 (Supp. 1998)).
14
SPrintz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368-69.
14

See id. at 2384.

M"See id. at 2368.
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chasers.'" Nevertheless, the Brady Act did not require CLEOs to
prevent the firearm sale regardless of the background check results.'" If a prospective purchaser was found ineligible, however, the
Brady Act required the CLEO to provide the prospective purchaser
with a written reason for the rejection."'
Authoring the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia held the interim
provisions unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.' 2 Printz
expanded the Court's holding in New York by finding that a state's
area of inviolable sovereignty extended to its executive officials as
well as to its legislature. 5 The Court's reasoning, as in New York,
rested both on textual and normative explanations.'"
Justice Scalia began by addressing the government's contention
that the earliest Congresses had enacted statutes requiring state officials to implement federal laws.' 5 The Justice dispensed with this argument by asserting that these laws only implied a power of the federal government to oblige state judges to enforce federal law."" Such
power was implicit, the Justice argued, in the Supremacy Clause.'
The Court further argued that the absence of any federal command
to state officials by early Congresses evidenced that the Framers did
not intend for Congress to have such power."
The Court analyzed the government's reliance on several passages from The FederalistPapers in which Hamilton and Madison suggested that the federal government would be able to use state officials in implementing its policies.'" Justice Scalia noted that these
See id. at 2369.
See id.
1 See id.
152
ePrintz, 117S. Ct. at 2368, 2383.
153 See id. at 2384.
15
See id. at 2370-82.
'
See id. at 2370.
1' Seeid. at 2371.
157 See id. Article VI of the United States Constitution
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
IS &ePintz, 117S. Ct. at 2372.
15
See id. (quoting THE FEDERAUsT No. 36, at 221 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDIAsT No. 45, at 292 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), both of which opine that local officials would aid in
collecting federal taxes).
149

50
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passages were consistent with an interpretation that required states
to consent before the federal government could use state officials to
advance federal goals.83
Of particular importance to Justice Scalia's discussion in Printz
were concerns about tyranny and accountability. 6' As to tyranny, the
Justice opined that federal commands to local officials undermine
the autonomy that is an essential attribute of state sovereignty.'
Likewise, Printz explained that the Brady Act strongly endangered
accountability because CLEOs would be blamed for any errors in
administering the Act's provisions.
Thus, the Printz Court determined that Congress offends the
principles of federalism and exceeds its authority where it commands a state to act; the Court should not consider the compelling
national interest asserted.'" This unbending rule implies that there
is strong textual and historical support; a closer examination, however, reveals that both the Framers' intent and the historical record
are more equivocal than the rule suggests.'"
III. CHALLENGING THE RATIONALES

The most persuasive evidence that the Framers did not intend
to prohibit Congress from commandeering the states is that none of
the Framers ever mentioned such a rule.' 3 Indeed, many passages in
The FederalistPapers suggest that the Framers expected Congress to
use state officers to execute federal laws. ' 7 For example, both Hamilton and Madison suggested that the federal government would use

ISO
See id. at 2372-73.
See id. at 2377.

161

162
163

See id. at 2381.
See id. at 2382. TheJustice instructed that

[u]nder the present law, for example, it will be the CLEO and not
some federal official who stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun. And it will likely be the CLEO, not
some federal official, who will be blamed for any error (even one in
the designated federal database) that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly rejected.
Id.164
See Pintz, 117 S.
Ct. at 2384.
W See infra notes 166-90 (challenging the rationales).
See Printz, 117 S. C. at 2386, 2393-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding that at
least one of the Framers would have mentioned an anti-commandeering rule had
they intended it).
See id. at 2389 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (asserting that the Framers intended to
empower the central government to act both directly on individuals and against the
states).
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state officials to collect taxes.'" Hamilton also contended that state

officials would stand ready to enforce national laws in general.'"
Hamilton further asserted that state officers would be bound to enforce federal laws; this represents the most convincing evidence of
the Framers' intent."" Despite the Court's efforts to offer alternative
readings of these passages, Justice Scalia could offer no affirmative
proof that the Framers intended to proscribe commandeering.'
Is

See THE FanmAusr No. 27, at 176-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961) ("The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each in the execution of its laws."). As
James Madison explained:
It is true that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the
power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the
States; but it is probable ...that the eventual collection, under the
immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable that in other instances, particularly in
the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be
clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.
Ti- FEDERa= No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
169 See THE FEInzRAusr No. 16, at 117 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("The magistracy, being equally the ministers of the law land from whatever source it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready to guard the national as
the local regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness.").
170 See THE FEDErA
No. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). Hamilton stated that
[i] t merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy as to the enumerated and egitimate objects of its jurisdiction
will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of
which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial in each State will
be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and
magistrates, of the respective members will be incorporated into the
operations of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends, and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.
Id.
1 See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2368, 2372 (arguing that The FederalistNos. 27 and 45
do not imply congressional power to command state compliance; rather they "rest
on the natural assumption that the States would consent to allowing their officials to
assist the Federal Government"). Justice Souter contends that, because the plain
reading of the phrases "'will be incorporated into the operations of the national
government" and "'will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws," the
federal government could require state officers and magistrates to implement federal law. Id. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia suggests two problems withJustice Souter's interpretation. See id. at 2373. First,Justice
Scalia argues that if such a reading were correct state executives would be bound to
implement federal law without any directive; the Justice maintains that no one has
ever suggested that the law requires this. See id. But see Prakash, supra note 13, at
2000-01 (instructing that federal law can never commandeer state officers, because
their duties are to enforce the laws of the land without regard to the source of the
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Therefore, The FederalistPapersundermine any argument for the noncommandeering doctrine relying on the Framers' intent'"
Likewise, the history of the early Congresses offers scant support
for the non-commandeering rule, except that Congress rarely conscripted state officials.' Justice Scalia acknowledged that there were
some early instances of commandeering of judges by Congress, but
maintained that those commands were permissible under the Supremacy Clause.
Additional examples of early Congresses commandeering executive officers include a 1790 statute conscripting
state justices of the peace to evaluate vessels for seaworthiness"' and
a 1798 Act directing
state judges to deport alien enemies of the
76
United States.

Justice Scalia placed considerable emphasis on the absence of
commandeering statutes in the historical record, noting that these
statutes are a recent invention.'" Indeed, the Court suggested that
the absence of such early congressional enactments evidences that
the Constitution prohibits such behavior.'
More likely, the dearth
of congressional commands evidences the impracticality of such
measures in the early years of the republic, rather than their unconstitutionality.179 The Framers, responding to the failure of the Articles of Confederation, empowered the federal government to act di-

law). Second, Justice Scalia maintains that Justice Souter's reading would likewise
make state governing bodies subject to federal direction and that the Court foreclosed such a possibility in New York See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2373. Of course, even

though the Court held commandeering of state legislatures unconstitutional in New
York, that holding does little to illuminate the Framers' intent. See Prakash, supra
note 13, at 2006-07 (concluding, after a thorough historical review of the founding
period, that the proponents of the Constitution drew a distinction between commandeering state executives and commandeering state legislatures).
1
See Powell, supranote 2, at 664 (arguing thatJustice O'Connor's vision of federalism contradicts the plain reading of The FederalistPapers).
173 See/ rintz, 117 S. Ct. at 2375.
174 See id. at 2371. But see Prakash, supra note 13, at 2006 (arguing that
the original understanding was that state executives were more like judges than legislators).
75See Caminker, supra note 2, at 1044-45.
176 Se id. at 1045 & n.175.

SSee Pvintz, 117 S. Ct. at 2375. Justice Scalia addressed the World War I Draft
Act of 1917, which the government cited as an instance of executive commandeering. See id. The Act authorized the President to enlist any state or federal officers
or agencies to implement the Act. See id. The Act further provided a misdemeanor
penalty for any official that failed to comply. See id. The Justice remarked that in
executing the Act President Wilson solicited the state governors to give orders to
their subordinate officers. See id.
t8 See id. at 2370.

See Caminker, supranote 2, at 1057.
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rectly for the people.' 8 Logic does not dictate, however, that the
Constitution therefore sought to deprive Congress of the power to
obligate states to execute federal law."' Ultimately, the Court relied
on a creative reading of The FederalistPapersand dubious logic, asserting that because Congress did not exercise such power in the past
such power never existed.'8 2 Of course, given the inefficacy of direct
coercion during the period when Congress operated under the Articles, it would be more surprising if early Congresses had attempted
to conscript the states as their agents.
Even if textual and historical analyses do not support a noncommandeering rule, the Court might justify the rule on normative
grounds. " As far back as IERC, Justice O'Connor identified four
guiding principles of federalism that have guided the Court's decisions.'" These principles (1) ensure that both state and federal officials remain accountable to their respective electorates,' (2) permit
states to serve as laboratories for experimentation, 1 (3) encourage
political involvement and thereby foster democracy,'" and (4) prevent tyranny.'
Although the Court announced that the Constitution would prohibit commandeering even if federalism provided no
benefits to anyone,'- astute commentators have noted that interpre-

ISOSee supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text (discussing Alexander Hamil-

ton's comments in The Federalist).
181 Compare

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (arguing that

the Constitution forecloses the possibility of Congress conscripting state legislatures
and executives) with Powell, supra note 2, at 652-53 (maintaining that the Framers'
decision to confer powers on Congress to regulate individuals rather than states
does not signify that they intended to deprive Congress of the powers it possessed
under the Articles).
in See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370, 2372.

See supra note 98 and accompanying text (suggesting that state autonomy
should be weighed as a factor in determining the scope of Congress's enumerated
powers).
184 See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-90
(1982) (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18 See supranote 9 and accompanying text (discussing accountability as a principle of federalism).
18 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (analyzing experimentation as a
principle of federalism).
"7 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (examining democracy
as a principle
of federalism).
I$ See supra note 10 and accompanying text (highlighting the reduced risk of
tyranny as a principle of federalism).
188 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (stating that the
Court's task is not to devise the best system of government, but to apply the framework erected in the Constitution).
"89
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tations of the Constitution that benefit no one are rarely persuasive. 19
IV. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK
Concurring in Printz,Justice O'Connor noted that, although a
provision directly compelling the administration of a federal regulatory program by a state official violates the Constitution, the Court
properly refrained from ruling if a purely ministerial reporting requirement on state officials would be equally invalid."
Because
purely ministerial reporting requirements nonetheless command
state and local officials to act, it is unclear under what theory such
mandates might be saved from the rule in Printz.'" This section examines the theories under which the reporting provision of NCSAA
might be distinguished from the interim background check provision of the Brady Act. 93 The analysis concludes that the acts are similar in kind, and are different only in degree.'" Consequently, the
Court cannot uphold one and overturn the other while remaining
true to the holding in Printz
Post-Printz, Congress has three valid means for affecting the actions of state legislatures and executive officers.'" First, Congress
may threaten to preempt a field if a state refuses to implement a specific policy." Second, Congress may condition spending on state
compliance with a federal program.'9 Third, Congress may force
states to comply with laws of general application.'"
In many situations, the Printz holding merely dictates that Congress must choose one of these alternate routes rather than abandon

190 See Rubin

& Feeley, supra note 8, at 906.
See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'a' See id. at 2376. Justice Scalia distinguished between statutes that "require only
the provision of information to the Federal Government" and those that force
.participation of the States' executive in the actual administration of a federal program." Id.
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (2) (Supp. 1998) (struck down by the Printz Court, 117
S. Ct. at 228-84).
'94 See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (showing that
not all commands
endanger federalism).
'" See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text (discussing
the various tools
through which Congress can encourage state compliance).
'" See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 28889 (1981).
197See South Dakotav. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08
(1987).
i'@See Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
1
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its legislative purpose.' " For instance, rather than command CLEOs
to perform background checks, Congress could theoretically condition state receipt of law enforcement funding on satisfactory performance of such checks.' Where Congress cannot offer an appealing incentive, where the threat of preemption is hollow, or where
compliance is essential, however, a congressional command may be
the only effective tool."'
NCSAA commands state, local, and federal law enforcement
agencies to report all missing-child cases to the Department of Justice's National Crime Information Center.2 Congress identified two
impediments to effective investigation and recovery of missing children."0 First, prior to NCSAA, many law enforcement agencies observed waiting periods before their officers could take a missing persons report. States that adopted such policies justified the delay by
rationalizing that the children were not missing and would return on
their own volition. 5 Congress found however that the first twentyfour hours after a child's disappearance was the period of greatest
danger; it thus mandated that law enforcement agencies dispense
with a waiting period and enter information about the missing child
immediately.2
Second, Congress found that the interstate movement of abducted children would most likely occur within the first forty-eight
hours of abduction."- Therefore, entry of information into the National Crime Information Center database would significantly aid law
enforcement agencies in locating missing children.2
Although
forty-one states had their own missing children databases, the information was not entered into a national centralized database.'
Without a national vehicle for disseminating such information, the
SeeNewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (suggesting that Congress can use several methods to encourage state compliance with a federal plan).
2
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
"I See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text (demonstrating that commandeering is the only tool that can guarantee state compliance under certain circumstances).
See 136 CONG. REc. H11,469 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
203 See id. (statement of Rep. Edwards).
19

2Seeid.

Seid.
See id.
M See id. (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
2
See 136 CONG. REc. H11,469 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
2" See id. at H11,470 (statement of Rep. Erdreich).
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information did not adequately assist law enforcement officials in locating children carried across state lines. 10 Consequently, NCSAA's
sponsors enacted the measure to remedy the inconsistency in reporting procedures and formats among the states.2
NGSAA's reporting requirement exemplifies an instance where
a congressional command may be the only effective tool. Congress
must have full compliance with the reporting requirement to fulfill
the purposes of NCSAA.
A conditional spending measure, if designed consistent with South Dakota v. Dole 2 13 would not assure univer-

sal compliance because some states receive little federal aid for local
law enforcement.214 Likewise, Congress presumably could not preempt state and local law enforcement for two reasons. 2 15 First, Con-

gress's commerce power is not broad enough to preempt the field of
local law enforcement.2 Second, even if Congress were authorized
to preempt state law enforcement, doing so merely to carry out the
purposes of NGSAA would be prohibitively expensive. 7 Indeed, in
210

See 136

CONG.

RItc. S9123 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statement of Sen.

McConnell).
2
See id.
212 See Serial Killers and Child Abductions: Tetimony Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the House Comm. on the Judiciaty, 104th Cong. 66 (1995) (testimony of Ernest E. Allen, President, National Center for Missing and Exploited Children).
213 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
The Court recognized four restrictions on the
exercise of the spending power. See id. First, "the exercise of the spending power
must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare.'" Id. at 207. Second, any conditional
spending measure must express the condition explicitly so that states are fully aware
of the consequences of their decisions. See id. Third, the conditions on federal
spending must be related to the federal interest. See id. Lastly, the condition must
not violate any other provision of the Constitution. See id. at 208.
214 See OFFICE OF MANAGEmENr & Btm'GE,
BuIGx- INFORMATION FOR STATES 97
(1997). Block grants to states for local law enforcement agencies in 1996 ranged
from a high of $71,223,000 in California to a low of $702,000 in West Virginia. See
id. Thirteen states received less than $1,100,000 in block grants. See id. The Dole
Court noted that a conditional spending measure must not rise to the level where it
coerces state compliance. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. It seems unlikely, at least for the
thirteen least subsidized states, that the federal government could offer an incentive
large enough to ensure compliance, yet small enough to avoid contravening the
limitation imposed by Dole. See id.
2
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); Caminker, supra
note 2, at 1073.
216 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (explaining that the states are the
proper sovereisn for making and enforcing criminal laws).
See Caminker, supra note 2, at 1073 (opining that where Congress decides to
legislate through a command the decision may merely reflect a belief that "a certain
policy is not worth pursuing if its implementation would require establishing a
costly, cumbersome, or otherwise intrusive federal enforcement bureaucracy, but
worth pursuing if it could be implemented more inexpensively and easily through
the states' existing enforcement machinery").
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this case, where the costs of preemption are prohibitively high and
where spending incentives cannot assure compliance, Congress
needs to command. 18
The question remains whether the Tenth Amendment will
permit a command for purely ministerial purposes. 1 ' In light of the
majority's declaration that it is the command itself that offends the
Tenth Amendment, it is unclear how there could be enough constitutional breathing room for NCSAA to survive if challenged. m The
Court has justified its non-commandeering doctrine on textual, historical, and normative grounds." As demonstrated in Part III, the
textual and historical explanations are not strong enough to justify
the doctrine m Some ministerial mandates however do not implicate
these normative considerations.
Congressional commands can raise the normative federalism
concerns of accountability, democracy, tyranny, and experimentation.2" As the cases demonstrate, however, not all congressional
commands raise these concerns to the same degree. For instance,
LLRWAA, at issue in New York, triggered concerns for accountability
and democracy, but not for tyranny or experimentation.2 4 In contrast, the Brady Act considered in Printz implicates the concerns for
tyranny and accountability, but not for democracy or experimentation. m Although NCSAA would violate the plain reading of the noncommandeering doctrine,m it does not raise concerns about any
principle of federalism.
218

ButseeNewYorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) ("The question is

not what power the Federal Government ought to have but what powers in fact have
been given by the people.'") (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63
(1936)).
219 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385 (1997) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court appropriately refi-ained from ruling whether
purely ministerial mandates should be prohibited).
12
See id. at 2383 (stating that a federal command to a state offends "the very
pn'ncipk of separate state sovereignty").
See supra notes 100-63 and accompanying text (discussing a brief history of
federalism in Part 11 of this Note).
2n See supra notes 166-90 and accompanying text (challenging
the rationales for
the anti-commandeering doctrine).
2
See supra notes 9-12 (discussing the principles of federalism).
See NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 168-69 (1992).
See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2368, 2377 (1997).
2" But see Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769
(1982) (holding that there had been no command to the States, even though the
statute required state utilities to consider federal regulations yearly). The Court
might make a distinction between statutes that command state officials to enforce a
statute and those that require reporting information gathered in the normal course
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The overinclusiveness of the non-commandeering doctrine evidences its lack of a guiding principle. An absolute prohibition on
commandeering is neither provided for explicitly in the Constitution, nor necessary to secure the values of federalism. Here, purely
ministerial reporting requirements are subsumed within the rule,
even though some reporting requirements pose none of the dangers
the rule was intended to prevent. Such overinclusiveness is indefensible when the Court is capable of protecting those interests in the
normal course of judicial review. Therefore, the Court should abandon the non-commandeering doctrine in favor of a balancing test
that directly protects the principles the Framers intended the Tenth
Amendment to secure.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since opening the door to judicial protection of federalism
principles, the Court has struggled to find a manageable framework. 7 The traditional government function test proved virtually
impossible to apply because the Court could not determine logically
what was "traditional. " 28
Likewise, the Court's current noncommandeering doctrine will prove unworkable. If the Court applies the rule consistently, it will frustrate some legitimate purposes
of Congress without furthering the goals of federalism. If, however,
the Court creates unprincipled exceptions to the doctrine, it will become as vague as the test in National League of Cities,m which
prompted the Court to abandon its federalism jurisprudence in
1985. If the Court indeed has a "constitutional responsibility"' to
protect the states against federal intrusions, it should adopt a test
better tailored to protect the underlying principles of the Tenth
Amendment.

of state duties. See id. This distinction would narrow the scope of the anticommandeering doctrine, but it would also lead to the same interpretive problems
that prompted Justice O'Connor's dissent in FERC. See 456 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
20 See TaiBE, supra note 34, at 395 (arguing that '[tlhe notion
that the Supreme
Court has the obligation to protect against federal incursions on states' rights seems
unassailable; but the rickety structure which the Court put in place to protect those
rights turned out to do no such thing.").
See supra note 94 and accompanying text (summarizing the holding in Garcia).
2
See supranotes 31-48 (discussing NationalLeague of Cities).
2o See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
588-89 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (urging that the Court should adjudicate conflicts between the commerce power and states' rights).
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The following framework would give courts flexibility to strike
down statutes that pose a grave danger to the principles of federalism, while upholding statutes with minimal effects on the federal
balance or where the national interest outweighed any threat to state
sovereignty. First, does the federal statute regulate the states as
states? Second, does the statute have a substantial impact on the accountability of state officials to their electorates, on the ability of
states to experiment, or on the ability of citizens to influence the direction of local government? Third, does the federal statute pose a
threat of tyranny? Fourth, could the federal interest be served with a
lesser impact on the principles of state sovereignty. Finally, is the nature of the federal interest so compelling that the principles of state
sovereignty must yield?
The Constitution does not impose specific limits on Congress's
power to direct the states, because when the Framers wrote the Constitution they did not conceive that the federal government would
take on such an expansive role.l The distinction between those
powers enumerated and those reserved to the states seemed clear
when commerce meant commerce." 2 As the Court interpreted
commerce more expansively, however, the line where federal authority ended and state authority began became blurred. The modern
Court understands that if the Tenth Amendment is interpreted as
merely a truism, and the commerce power as plenary, the federal system cannot fulfill its promise. Therefore, rather than using commandeering as a proxy for preserving federalism, the Court should
either move closer to the original meaning of commerce,2 3 3 or explic-

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). Justice O'Connor
noted that
[t] he Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have
been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the
21

Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have
believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities.
Id. (emphasis in original).
2

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-

ring). Justice Thomas instructed that
[a] t the time the original Constitution was ratified, "commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for
these purposes .... As one would expect, the term "commerce" was
used in contradistinction to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture.
Id. (citations omitted).
SSee id. at 567 (declining to expand further the scope of the commerce power).
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idy balance federal2 interests against the principles underlying the
Tenth Amendment. ,
JohnD. TortoreUa

See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (declaring that a law
directing a state executive to act compromises the structure of dual sovereignty).

